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i 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant, Eugene L. Kimball, respectfully 
petitions the Court for a rehearing in the above-entitled matter, 
specifically with respect to the decision and opinion of this 
Court filed on January 2, 1990, which reversed the judgment of 
the trial court. 
This petition is presented in good faith, and not for delay. 
Petitioner respectfully represents to the Court that: 
1. The Court's decision while stating sound principles of 
law applies them to a different factual situation. 
2. The Court's decision on the issue raised by S. M. 
Horman (herein Horman) and Banberry of "purchase" or "payment" of 
the Banberry Notes to First Security creates a conundrum since 
the issue of "purchase" or "payment" was and is mooted by the 
actions of the parties and was not a proper issue before this 
Court on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
A - OMITTED FACTS FROM THE MAJORITY OPINION 
The majority opinion written by Chief Justice Hall spends 
only one and a half pages in outlining the facts. While it is 
understandable that the majority of the facts which occurred in 
the course of this litigation are not worthy of mention in the 
court's opinion, the heart of the jury's determination as to 
fraud and as to lien priority rests upon the defendants during 
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the lien litigation, Reading the facts as now stated in the 
court's opinion can only create bewilderment as to why the jury 
would have ever found in favor of respondent Kimball in the first 
place. After all, according to the majority opinion First 
Security and an unrelated trust merely entered into an agreement 
concerning some property in Park City and did not communicate 
this fact to respondent Kimball. Why should a jury and a lower 
court in making separate findings of equity be so excited about 
such a simple transaction? 
The opinion should be amended to enunciate that the October 
1984 Purchase Agreement contained a number of unusual provisions 
which the respondent Kimball has previously characterized as 
"badges of fraud." There were six separate unusual "red flags" 
which took this transaction away from the normal course of 
business dealing in which a senior lienholder is merely selling 
its interest to an outside purchaser. These are: 
(1) The October Purchase Agreement was concealed 
and kept secret - even the bank's own lawyers were 
excluded from knowing the basis of the agreement and 
the Agreement expressly contained a provision assigning 
any risk of disclosure to Sidney Horman. 
(2) The agreement did not occur during normal 
business transactions but occurred during the Kimball 
litigation. Unlike almost all court proceedings the 
defendants did not even make the existence of an 
agreement known to the court — even assuming that the 
facts of the agreement were confidential. 
(3) The transaction was accomplished with false 
statements of consideration since the $lf600,000 
certificate of deposit was admitted by the bank as a 
false step without business purposes which the bank 
admitted was solely to prevent the transaction from 
being considered a payment of the first lien. 
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(4) Rather than a normal business transaction the 
transfer was disguised as something else. The bank 
kept possession of the First Security trust deeds even 
though the payment for the loans was absolute and 
unqualified. the bank was not to transfer possession 
to Horman until after Kimball's equity of redemption 
had passed. 
(5) The bank stayed in possession of the loan and 
the security and continued to pursue the foreclosure as 
if nothing had occurred. If this were not a fraudulent 
manipulation to extinguish Kimball's rights, the bank 
would have recorded the proper instruments with the 
county recorder. 
(6) The Agreement is literally full of language 
that denotes concern that the Agreement is a fraud and 
specifically assigns to Horman all risk of discovery 
and risk of losing insurance under the title policy. 
The omission of this factual sequence which convinced both 
the jury and the lower court that wrongful conduct had occurred 
completely white washes the opinion of this Court and unjustly 
casts doubt upon the wisdom of the jury and the lower court in 
finding the defendants liable for fraud. This omission of 
critical facts then allows the court in the legal analysis to 
apply legal principles which are themselves sound but which 
should not be applied to the factual context of this case. 
B - ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY OPINION 
The majority frames this appeal as follows: 
The dispositive issue on appeal in relation to the 
fraud claim is whether a duty existed on the part of 
defendants to disclose to Kimball the existence and 
content of the Purchase Agreement. (Slip Opinion, p. 
3). 
The Court then makes a detailed analysis of duties between 
banks and customers and first and second lienholders and 
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concludes that no duty existed in this case to disclose the 
Settlement Agreement. 
The principles stated by the majority opinion are not 
disputed by respondent Kimball. Kimball completely agrees with 
the analysis of duty in disclosure matters including the 
requirement of fiduciary relationships or dissimilar bargaining 
power. Furthermore, Kimball readily agrees that a senior 
lienholder should not normally have to be concerned about 
affirmatively notifying a junior lienholder of its actions in 
order to avoid claims of fraud or other actions. 
Thus, essentially the opinion of the Court is a well-
reasoned decision in applying general principles of law in the 
banking-mortgage industry. The decision establishes useful 
guidelines in the normal course of business for otherwise usual 
types of transactions. Unfortunately, however, all of these 
noble principles stated in the majority opinion fail to recognize 
the facts of this case which do not conform to the normal 
banking-mortgage transaction. 
These distinctions can be illustrated with two examples: 
Assume that ffFH the first lienholder negotiates with "T" a 
third party who agrees to purchase the first mortgage of f,DM the 
debtor. In the normal course of business this transaction would 
be reflected in documents recorded in the County Recorder's 
office and "T" would assume nF,f,s position. In such an instance, 
as noted by the majority opinion, it would be ludicrous to 
require f,FH or "T" formally to notify the second lienholder, lfStf, 
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of this transaction. "S" is capable of learning about it through 
normal business channels and, in any event, has not been harmed 
because of the transfer. This example fits into the majority 
opinion language governing the principles behind such 
transactions. 
However, as a second example assume facts which are 
analogous to what actually happened in the instant case. MF" and 
f,Tff agree that f,TH will purchase the interest of "F" or, in the 
alternative, will pay "D"'s obligation in full. However, it is 
expressly conditioned in the transaction that such payment or 
purchase shall be kept secret until such time as "S" loses any 
rights he may have to claim an interest in the property. What if 
this in fact had happened in the instant case and that respondent 
Kimball was unable to exercise his foreclosure rights as a junior 
lienholder because he was unaware that the first lien had been 
extinguished. This may well have occurred if the deception had 
not been discovered during the litigation. Can this deliberate 
concealment of the status of the first lien merely be 
characterized as a typical garden-type of transaction as 
illustrated in the numerous cases cited by the majority opinion 
in support of the "general11 overriding principles of law? As we 
noted in our opening brief any conduct to deprive a lienholder of 
his lien by trick, cunning, device or deceit is a fraud. 
(Respondent's Opening Brief, p. 51). 
Thus, the instant case is not a case involving the question 
of whether a senior lienholder or debtor has an obligation to 
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inform a second lienholder of a transaction or event. Instead, 
it is a case involving an attempt on the part of the first 
lienholder and the debtor fraudulently to deprive a second 
lienholder of his interest by manipulating the transaction in 
such a way as to cause an extinguishment of the second 
lienholder's rights. The failure of the majority opinion to 
identify this issue completely distorts the conclusion and 
completely obfuscates the findings of the jury and the lower 
court by applying sound principles of law to a fact situation 
involving extremely unsound business transactions. 
The decision may have good precedential value containing 
sound law and principles but, but we submit it is completely 
inappropriate to what actually occurred below. The only method 
to correct this substantial problem is to vacate the present 
opinion and to allow a rehearing in which the correct facts and 
focus can be made. 
II 
THE ISSUE OF "PURCHASE" OR "PAYMENT OP THE BANBERRY NOTES WAS 
NEVER A PROPER ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT ON APPEAL 
The parties to the Agreement of October, 1984, sometimes 
referred to as the "Purchase Agreement" were First Security Bank, 
First Security Financial (herein referred to as First Security or 
FSB) and the Horman Family Trust. The Horman Family Trust was 
never a direct party to this action, nor was it involved in the 
case except through the claim that S. M. Horman (herein Horman) 
was the alter ego of the Horman Family Trust. This issue was 
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resolved by the jury's verdict that Horman was not the alter ego 
of the Horman Family Trust, from which no appeal was taken. 
The record discloses that the issue of purchase or payment 
arose following the trial court's determination that the 
agreement between First Security and the Horman Family Trust 
should be produced. In the joint pretrial statement Kimball 
claimed that "The debts to FSB and FSF were fully satisfied in 
October, 1984/* and "there was a merger of the FSB and FSF's 
liens and title under the October, 1984 Agreement." (R. 2868). 
First Security claimed "The October 3, 1984, Settlement Agreement 
resulted in no merger of title." (R 2877). And, Banberry 
"adopts the defenses of FSB and FSF in regard to the October, 
1984, Settlement Agreement." (R. 2880). 
Following the trial on the issues, the jury returned a 
special verdict to the effect that Horman was not the alter ego 
of the Horman Family Trust when the Purchase Agreement (Exhibit 
No. 1028) was made in October of 1984, and answered, "yes" to the 
interrogatory with respect to whether the Purchase Agreement 
constituted a "payment" from Banberry Crossing to First Security 
Bank and First Security Financial of the Trust Deed Notes. 
Following the entry of its Findings and Conclusions the 
Court entered its Decree: 
(1) That the liens of First Security Bank and First 
Security Financial on the subject Banberry Property have 
been extinguished. 
(2) That the Trust Deeds of First Security Bank 
and First Security Financial on the subject Banberry 
Property may not be foreclosed. 
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(3) That the preliminary injunction heretofore 
issued in this matter against Eugene Kimball and Keith 
Garner enjoining them from administratively foreclosing 
their deeds of trust on the subject Banberry Property 
may be, and the same hereby is, dissolved. 
(4) The First Security Bank and First Security 
Financial are ordered to forthwith reconvey their deeds 
of trust on the subject Banberry Property to the 
appropriate Banberry entity. 
Note that while this was an adverse ruling to the specific 
contention of First Security, it was a finding favorable to 
Banberry since now Banberry's notes were "paid." First Security 
was directed by the Court to reconvey the property, which it did, 
and did not thereafter appeal from the verdict of the jury and/or 
the decree of the trial court. Likewise, Kimball did not appeal 
from the jury verdict and decision of the lower court that Horman 
was not the alter ego of the Horman Family Trust. This 
eliminated any party who might otherwise have had a right to 
complain about the jury findings and the Court's decision on this 
issue. 
It is obvious that Banberry had no basis for appeal from 
the verdict of the jury and the decision of the court that their 
notes to First Security were fully paid and discharged by the 
"Purchase Agreement" since they no longer were obligated on those 
notes. 
It also appears to be a moot question, even though Horman 
and Banberry raised that issue on appeal. As an individual 
Horman has no standing to raise the issue, and Banberry likewise 
could not to raise an issue as to whether the transaction 
involved a payment or a purchase since by the determination of 
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the jury that there was a payment, Banberry was completely 
discharged from any liability - the best possible position it 
could be in. In the case of Godesky vs. Provo City Courts, 690 
P. 2d 541 (Utah 1984), this Court held that one party cannot 
assign as error a ruling against a different party, where the 
appealing party reserved no exception. See also United Salt 
Corp. vs. McKee, 628 P.2d 310, (N.M. 1981). Poteau State Bank 
vs. Denwalt, 597 P.2d 756 (Okl. 1979). In this case, having been 
relieved of any liability arising from the "Purchase Agreement" 
by the determination that he was not the alter ego of Horman 
Family Trust, Horman was no longer in a position to raise the 
issue of purchase or payment. Likewise, First Security who was a 
party to the transaction and who may have raised the issue did 
not do so on appeal, but followed the Court's Order and Judgment 
by reconveying the property. 
We recognize that this matter has not been specifically 
presented to the court prior to this time, but under the 
circumstances of this case we believe that a Petition for 
Rehearing should be granted because of the exceptional 
circumstance which exist here in order to do substantial justice 
and because of fundamental and jurisdictional issues. 
We call the Court's attention to its recent decision in 
Jolivet vs. Cook, 115 Ut. Adv. Report 17, 19 (Utah 1989), where 
this Court stated "we have held that in the absence of 
exceptional circumstances, this Court will not entertain a claim 
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raised for the first time on appeal." (Emphasis added). We 
respectfully submit that exceptional circumstances exist here. 
It is without question that both First Security and Horman 
were proper persons to raise the issue of purchase or payment 
when that issue was first raised by Kimball that the "Purchase 
Agreement" resulted in a payment of the promissory notes of 
Banberry to First Security. However, that issue was resolved 
against First Security which has not appealed to this court, and 
second, Mr. Horman was found not to be the alter ego of the 
Horman Family Trust, which likewise was not appealed to this 
Court. 
The issue is one of fundamental jurisdiction which is of 
such importance that this Court may and should have raised the 
question on its own Motion and should now do so in having had the 
matter called to its attention. A rehearing on this matter would 
give the respective parties full opportunity to present their 
positions and arguments. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, it is respectfully requested that this Court 
vacate the entire opinion and analyze it in light of the facts of 
this case rather than the general law of disclosure between banks 
and mortgagees. While the opinion of the majority is certainly 
an accurate synopsis of the legal obligations normally existing 
in a commercial transaction, it does not properly focus upon the 
issues involved in this case, involving the conduct of the 
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parties during the litigation of the liens. We believe it is 
certainly unfair and improper to use the present litigation as a 
sounding board for generally accepted principles of law while, at 
the same time, failing properly to address the events and 
circumstances of the case being litigated. 
For the foregoing reasons, therefore, it is respectfully 
requested that a rehearing be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
t^ehur H. Nielsen, Esq. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Michael R. Christensen, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Craig S. Cook, Esq. 
Attorneys for Cross-Claimant 
and Appellant Eugene Kimball 
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